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LET’S TALK ABOUT SEX: DEFINING ‘SEXUALLY  
ORIENTED OR SEXUALLY STIMULATING’ 
MATERIAL IN SEX OFFENDER 
BEHAVIORAL CONTRACTS 
Ricardo F. Roybal* 
INTRODUCTION 
Sex offenders are perceived to be the “scourge of modern America, the 
irredeemable monsters that prey on the innocent.”1 As this quote indicates, sex 
offenders are painted by society with a single, rough brush. This view, facilitated by 
a handful of high-profile sexual assaults involving children in the early 1990’s, led 
to legislative action.2 
In New Mexico, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
(“SORNA”)3 requires individuals convicted of a sex crime to comply with various 
restrictions specified in “Sex Offender Supervision Behavioral Contracts.”4 Among 
the limitations in these sex offender contracts is a ban on viewing or possessing any 
“sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” materials.5 
In State of New Mexico v. Dinapoli,6 the New Mexico Court of Appeals 
addressed the constitutionality of this provision in a sex offender contract. In the 
case, the sex offender, Robert Dinapoli, was deemed to have violated this provision 
because he possessed three mainstream DVDs—the American and Swedish versions 
of The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo, and a third film titled I Spit on Your Grave. 
 
 *  University of New Mexico School of Law, Class of 2017. Thank you Professor Dawinder Sidhu 
for the thoughtful feedback and invaluable instruction you provided. My thanks also extend to Corinne 
Mack, Felecia Cantwell, and the rest of the New Mexico Law Review staff and board members for their 
insightful comments that enabled this Note to serve its purpose to resolve an issue within a sensitive area 
of law. In particular, a special thanks to Dominic A. Martinez for the countless and continuous 
contributions he provided to maximize the quality of this Note. Above all, I would like to thank my family 
for the tremendous guidance and never ending support that they have supplied at throughout my 
educational career. 
 1. See Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interested in the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and 
Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1167 (1999). 
 2. See generally Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Past, 
Present, & Future, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3 (2008), 
http://www.nesl.edu/userfiles/file/nejccc/vol34/1/logan.pdf. 
 3. See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 6, 86 P.3d 1050; see also NMSA 1978 § 29-11(A)-1 
(1995) (amended 1999) (explaining that that the statute “may be cited as the ‘Sex Offender Registration 
and Notification Act’”). 
 4. See Sex Offender Supervision Behavioral Contract, in N.M. CORRS. DEP’T, PPD SEX OFFENDER 
REGISTRATION, TRACKING AND SUPERVISION, [hereinafter Behavioral Contract], 
http://cd.nm.gov/policies/docs/CD-053200.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
 5. See Behavioral Contract, supra note 4, § 3(A). This Note separates the terms “sexually oriented” 
and “sexually stimulating” because the court interprets the terms independently. 
 6. 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 1, 350 P.3d 1259. 
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Dinapoli objected on the grounds that the he was deprived of notice due to the broad 
and vague structure of the violated term.7 The Court of Appeals rejected this 
argument and accordingly ruled that Dinapoli was afforded proper notice and 
dismissed the contention that the condition was overly broad or vague.8 This Note 
focuses on this issue and aims to resolve it. 
This Note argues that the provision prohibiting “sexually oriented or 
sexually stimulating” materials in Section 6(A) of the New Mexico sex offender 
contract is overbroad and impermissibly vague.9 As a result, this provision is prone 
to arbitrary and biased decision-making, and fails to provide proper notice to the 
offender as to what conduct it prohibits. 
Part I provides an overview of specialized conditions of release, sex 
offender contracts, and the “sexually stimulating or sexually stimulating” provision. 
The history and development of sex offender sentences will be discussed. It also 
analyzes the purpose of specialized conditions of release, namely to promote public 
safety and reduce offender recidivism. This part will conclude by analyzing New 
Mexico v. Green,10the state’s seminal case regarding specialized conditions of 
release. 
Part II closely examines the recent case of New Mexico v. Dinapoli.11 In 
particular, it summarizes the facts of the case, the District Court’s decision, and the 
Court of Appeals’ ruling. 
Part III argues that the phrase “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” is 
over-inclusive and is subject to arbitrary enforcement. To prevent cases like 
Dinapoli, courts should provide a more definite standard to apply to specialized 
conditions than the reasonableness standard employed in Dinapoli. Accordingly, this 
Note aims to achieve two ends (1) to propose a definition that separates and 
individually defines “sexually oriented” and “sexually stimulating”; and (2) to 
supply probation officers with a guideline to that can be used to make enforcement 
of the condition more efficient and consistent. 
This Note identifies the notice and enforcement issues that were raised in 
Dinapoli and introduces a solution that will prevent similar issues from occurring in 
the future. The solution separates the terms “sexually oriented” and “sexually 
stimulating” to provide clear notice of its effect but it also narrows the wide range of 
materials it previously covered. Most importantly, the definition furthers the purpose 
behind specialized conditions of release at no expense to the strength of intended 
practice of the prohibition clauses. Alternatively, this definition will ensure that 
offenders are not unjustly stripped of their probation sentence because notice was 
not provided. Finally, and importantly, this definition prevents sex offenders from 
exploiting the uncertainty and gray area that the existing condition contains. Thus, 
the proposed definition will protect the public and provide the offender with a full 
and fair opportunity to rehabilitate and reintegrate back into society. 
 
 7. Id. ¶¶ 28, 33. 
 8. Id. ¶¶ 1, 8. 
 9. See Behavioral Contract, supra note 4, § 6(A) (“I will not purchase, possess or subscribe to any 
sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material. This includes, but is not limited to: Sexual devices, 
books, magazines, video/audio tapes, pictures, DVDs, CD ROMs, and Internet websites.”). 
 10. 2015-NMCA-007, 341 P.3d 10. 
 11. 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 1. 
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I.     UNDERSTANDING SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING IN NEW 
MEXICO: SUPERVISED RELEASE CONDITIONS AND 
SEX OFFENDER CONTRACTS 
A.  New Mexico’s Implementation of the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act 
In the early 1990’s, a series of high-profile sex crimes put sex offenders at 
the forefront of policy change.12 A 1994 New Jersey case fueled this change.13 This 
gruesome case involved a repeat sex offender who abducted, sexually abused, and 
murdered 7-year old Megan Kanka.14 In short order, Congress enacted the Jacob 
Wetterling Crimes Against Children Act and Sexually Violent Offender Registration 
Act, which provided federal guidelines and incentives for States to develop and 
implement sex offender registration programs.15 Two years later, Congress amended 
this statute and renamed it “Megan’s Law.”16 Under this law, states are required to 
provide community notification of sex offenders that are registered in their state.17 
New Mexico adopted its version of Megan’s Law in 1995, which is now 
titled the “Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act” (SORNA).18 SORNA’s 
purpose is to “assist law enforcement agencies’ efforts to protect their 
communities.”19 Under SORNA, criminals convicted of a sex crime are obligated to 
register as sex offenders in the state and comply with notification laws that inform 
the public of their status.20 Upon being released from a deferred sentence, sex 
offenders receive specialized conditions of release that serve to carry out the purpose 
of SORNA. 
B.  Specialized Conditions of Release and Sex Offender Behavioral Contracts 
Specialized conditions of release are imposed when the probationer is 
released from prison.21 If a district court defers imposition of a sentence for a sex 
offender, or suspends all or any portion of a sentence for a sex offender, the sex 
offender is required to serve an indeterminate period of supervised probation for not 
less than five years and up to the natural life of the offender.22 Before being placed 
on probation, the district court provides the sex offender with a hearing to determine 
 
 12. Logan, supra note 2, at 5. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (1994); see also 42 U.S.C.A § 16902 (2006) (amending the Wetterling 
Act and establishing the Jacob Wetterling, Megan Nicole Kanka, and Pam Lychner Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Program). 
 16. Megan’s Law, LEGAL DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Megan’s+Law 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2016). 
 17. Logan, supra note 2, at 5. 
 18. NMSA 1978, § 29-11A-1 (1995). 
 19. NMSA 1978, § 29-11A-2(B) (1995). 
 20. See Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶¶ 19, 21. 
 21. See generally NMSA 1978, § 31-21-10.1 (2007). 
 22. See § NMSA 1978, 31-21-10.1(A) (2007). 
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the terms and conditions required to complete the term of supervised probation.23 
During the hearing, the district court may consider factors such as the “nature and 
circumstances of the offense” for which the offender was convicted, the “nature and 
circumstance of a prior sex offense,” if any, “efforts engaged in by the sex offender,” 
and the “danger to the community” posed by the sex offender.24 Ultimately, the 
district court is able to subject the sex offender to reasonable terms and conditions 
of probation. Two of these conditions include “being subject to intensive supervision 
by a probation officer of the corrections department” and “participating in an 
outpatient or inpatient sex offender treatment program.”25 
The New Mexico Corrections Department requires the offender to sign a 
Sex Offender Behavioral Contract (sex offender contract), which is composed of 
specialized conditions of release.26 The probation officer is charged with ensuring 
that the sex offender complies with obligations within the sex offender contract. This 
contract includes eight sections that require the offender to maintain continual 
communication with the department, while also restricting his conduct.27 These 
conditions are not always clear and sometimes lead to courtroom disputes about 
constitutionality as evidenced by the following case. 
In a case decided before Dinapoli, the New Mexico Court of Appeals 
interpreted constitutional issues arising from language within sex offender 
behavioral contracts. In State v. Green,28 the defendant was released from prison after 
serving five years in prison and was subsequently put on probation. The defendant 
was originally sentenced to nineteen years in prison but the rest of the term was 
suspended by the district court.29 Within months of his release, however, the trial 
court ordered the defendant to serve the rest of his sentence in prison, which included 
a one-year habitual offender enhancement.30 The probation violation report 
contained multiple infractions, including one that directly prohibited the possession 
of sexual images on his laptop.31 The violation occurred after the defendant’s 
probation officer visited his home and found a photo of a nude woman, as well other 
nude images, on the defendant’s computer.32 
 
 23. See § NMSA 1978, 31-21-10.1(B) (2007). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See NMSA 1978, § 31-21-10.1(D)(1–2) (2007). 
 26. The sex offender behavioral contract was implemented by the New Mexico Corrections 
Department as an attempt to better protect the public and rehabilitate sex offenders. See State v Green, 
2015-NMCA-007, 341, ¶ 11, P.3d 10 (providing an analysis of how sex offender behavioral contracts are 
mandated in New Mexico); see also John Bigelow, Increasing Public safety in New Mexico, During and 
After Incarceration: New Directions for Reform in New Mexico Corrections, GOVERNOR RICHARDSON’S 
TASK FORCE ON PRISON REFORM, 1 (2008), 
http://www.bhc.state.nm.us/pdf/200808/PrisonReformTaskForceFinalReproductiontoCD.pdf (describing 
the rationale for changing sentencing schemes in New Mexico due to population increases in New 
Mexico). 
 27. See Behavioral Contract, supra note 4, § 3(B). 
 28. 2015-NMCA-007, 341 P.3d 10. 
 29. Id. ¶ 1. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. ¶ 21. 
 32. Id. ¶ 24. 
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On appeal, the defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence from 
the record to support his probation being revoked.33 Specifically, the defendant 
contended that this condition (prohibiting the possession of sexual images) was 
overly vague such that a “reasonable person would not have known that the nude 
images would be considered pornography.”34 The court held that the State met its 
burden of showing that a reasonable and impartial mind would believe that the 
defendant violated the terms of probation, and that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion.35 The court reasoned that when the defendant signed the sex offender 
contract he acknowledged that he read and understood these additional supervision 
conditions.36 This included a condition that prohibited the defendant from possessing 
any “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material.”37 The defendant’s probation 
officer testified that he reviewed the conditions with the defendant and specifically 
informed him that probation officers would monitor his computer and can search it 
at any time for “pornography” or “sexually explicit material.”38 Moreover, the court 
noted that “sexually explicit exhibition” has been defined as a “graphic and 
unequivocal display or portrayal of nudity or sexual activity.”39 Similarly, the State’s 
Legislature has defined “sexual conduct” to include “act[s] of masturbation . . . 
physical contact with a person’s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, 
or, if such person be female, breasts.”40 Accordingly, the court concluded that these 
terms all fall within the scope of the term “sexually oriented” in Section 6(A) of the 
sex offender contract.”41 The court’s decision was the first to interpret specialized 
conditions of release that are included in a sex offender contract.42 Equally important, 
it was the State’s first case regarding sex offender probationary release to approach 
the issue of defining the phrase “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” material. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: STATE V. DINAPOLI 
A. Factual Background and Court Opinion 
Robert J. Dinapoli was on probation for two sex crimes that he pleaded 
guilty to in the early 1990’s. The first sex crime took place on June 30, 1990, when 
Dinapoli, while armed with a firearm, broke into the home of two women and 
sexually assaulted them.43 Dinapoli pleaded guilty, and as a result, he was sentenced 
 
 33. Id. ¶ 21. 
 34. Id. ¶¶ 8, 21. 
 35. Id. ¶ 22. 
 36. Id. ¶ 23. 
 37. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 4, State v. Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, 350 P.3d 1259 (No. 
33,004). 
 38. Green, 2015-NMCA-007, ¶ 23. 
 39. Id. ¶ 25. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. To the best of my knowledge, New Mexico is the only state that uses the term “sex offender 
behavioral contract” to describe the explicit agreement to adhere to specialized conditions of release. 
 43. Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 2. 
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to thirty years imprisonment followed by five years of probation, and was compelled 
to participate in inpatient and outpatient treatment.44 
The second sex crime occurred on October 3, 1991, before Dinapoli was 
charged with the first offense.45 Dinapoli was charged with sexual assault of a 
woman, attempted criminal sexually penetration, kidnapping, and false 
imprisonment.46 As part of a plea and disposition agreement,47 Dinapoli was 
sentenced to serve 364 days in custody followed by five years’ probation.48 Dinapoli 
began his sentence for both crimes in 1994.49 
Upon serving 14 years in prison, Dinapoli was released into the care of the 
New Mexico Behavioral Health Institute in Las Vegas, New Mexico.50 Dinapoli was 
unconvinced that this rehabilitative program was appropriate for him and quit after 
two days.51 Dinapoli insisted that he was not fit for the rehabilitation program and 
could not be around the other people at the Institute.52 Dinapoli communicated to his 
probation officer that he was responsible for raping two women and should be in 
prison.53 Dinapoli was certain that he would not be able to function outside of 
prison.54 The district court was then forced to revoke Dinapoli’s probation and 
consequently sent him back to prison to serve six years in prison followed by five 
years of probation.55 
Dinapoli was released from prison three years, but this time he was 
permitted to live at his mother’s house due to a degenerative neurological disorder.56 
Dinapoli also signed a sex offender behavioral contract on December 2, 2011.57 
Three months later, Dinapoli was arrested for violating two conditions under this sex 
offender contract.58 The first was a violation of Section 6(D), which prohibited 
Dinapoli from accessing electronic devices for sexually stimulating material, 
pornography, adult websites, and social networking sites.59 Dinapoli’s probation 
 
 44. Id. ¶ 3. 
 45. Id. ¶ 2. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Rule 9-408 NMRA. 
 48. Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 3. 
 49. Id. ¶ 2. 
 50. Id. ¶ 4. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. ¶ 4 (providing Dinapoli’s statement that “treatment was of no value to him and [he] wished 
to be returned to prison where he did not have to put up with anyone asking questions about his past 
behavior”). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. ¶ 4. 
 56. Id. ¶ 5. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. See also Behavioral Contract, supra note 4, § 6(D) (“I understand that any computer, camera, 
computer tablet, cell phone, thumb drive (USB drive), memory or any other electronic device I have access 
to, including the hard drive and removable drives may be examined for inappropriate content at any time. 
Inappropriate content includes, but is not limited to: Sexually stimulating material, Pornography (adult 
or child), adult websites, social networking sites, such as, but not limited to Facebook, MySpace and 
Mocospace, dating websites, and personal ads to include cell phone application.”). 
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officer stated that he accessed websites that depicted rape victims and rapists because 
“he wanted to learn more about what kind of rapist he was.”60 
The second violation occurred because Dinapoli was asked to leave his 
treatment meeting for being disruptive.61 The State filed a motion to revoke his 
probation and held a probation meeting on April 5, 2012.62 The district court, 
however, reinstated Dinapoli’s probation with an additional condition that prohibited 
him from accessing the Internet with his cell phone.63 
Dinapoli was found to be in possession of three prohibited DVDs only four 
months later, which threatened to revoke his probation revocation.64 The DVDs were 
discovered by his probation officer and were found in Dinapoli’s bedroom.65 The 
DVDs included the American and Swedish versions of The Girl with the Dragon 
Tattoo, as well as I spit on your Grave.66 Dinapoli’s probation officer, discovered the 
DVDs and considered them to be “extremely violent and sexually graphic in nature, 
and portray women being raped.”67 Dinapoli’s probation officer determined that the 
DVDs were prohibited under Section 6(A) of the sex offender contract.68 Section 
6(A) reads as follows: 
I will not purchase, possess or subscribe to any sexually oriented 
or sexually stimulating material. This includes, but is not limited 
to: Sexual devices, books, magazines, video/audio tapes, pictures, 
DVDs, CD ROMs, and Internet websites.69 
The State received a report of these findings and accordingly filed a motion 
to revoke Dinapoli’s probation.70 Ultimately, the district court found that Dinapoli 
violated Section 6(A) of the sex offender contract and revoked his probation. The 
district court then committed Dinapoli to the Department of Corrections for a term 
of five years and tacked on another five years of probation to follow upon his 
release.71 
In making its decision, the district court was shown clips from the three 
DVDs that were found in Dinapoli’s possession.72 The State played scenes from both 
versions of The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo.73 Dinapoli’s probation officer testified 
in court and described the scenes in the Swedish version depicting a woman being 
anally raped, and an oral sex scene that takes place in an office setting.74 The 
 
 60. Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 5. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. ¶ 6. 
 65. Id. ¶¶ 6, 9. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. ¶ 6. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Behavioral Contract, supra note 4, § 6(a). 
 70. Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 6. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. ¶ 9. 
 73. Id. ¶ 10. 
 74. Id. 
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probation officer also stated that the American version included an oral sex scene 
and was very similar to the Swedish version.75 
Additionally, the State viewed print content on the DVD covers. On the 
back of the American version of The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo the cover read 
“Rated R for brutal, violent content, including rape and torture, strong sexuality, and 
graphic nudity.”76 I Spit on your Grave, summarized the movie as “A group of local 
lowlifes subject the star of the movie to a nightmare of degradation, rape, and 
violence.”77 
Dinapoli explained that he watched the movies because of the revenge that 
the rape victims were able to impose upon their rapists.78 He testified that he did not 
receive any type of sexual satisfaction from watching the movies and that he believed 
the sex offender contract to solely prohibited pornography.79 Dinapoli explained that 
he was not cautioned to avoid scenes that were found in these types of mainstream 
videos.80 
On appeal, Dinapoli put forth multiple arguments about why his probation 
should not be revoked, but the Court of Appeals did not find any of them to be 
persuasive. First, Dinapoli argued that he did not have sufficient notice from the sex 
offender contract or the February violation that possession of the DVDs would 
violate the terms of his probation.81 Section 6(A) of the sex offender contract 
prohibited Dinapoli from possessing any “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” 
material. The court explained that the relevant inquiry was whether the DVDs were 
either “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating.”82 The court looked to see whether 
a reasonable person would determine that the DVDs fell into the “sexually oriented 
or sexually oriented” category.83 In short order, the court dismissed Dinapoli’s 
subjective point that he did not receive any sexual gratification from the movies. The 
court determined that the text on the DVD covers coupled with the graphic scenes 
that were presented, would put a reasonable person on notice that the DVDs were 
“sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” in violation of Section 6(A) of the sex 
offender contract.84 The court found no value or relevance in regard to the DVDs’ 
mainstream nature and availability.85 
Second, Dinapoli contended that Section 6(A) was limited to “adult” or 
“pornographic” material when read in conjunction with other provisions of the sex 
offender contract.86 The court noted that Section 6(D) of the contract prohibits 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. ¶ 9. 
 78. Id. ¶ 11. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. ¶ 7. 
 82. Id. ¶ 14. 
 83. Id. ¶ 15. 
 84. Id. ¶ 17. 
 85. Id. ¶ 18. 
 86. See id. ¶ 19 (providing other provisions of the contract, including the following: 
I understand that any computer, camera, computer tablet, cell phone, thumb drive (USB 
drive), memory or any other electronic device I have access to, including the hard drive 
and removable drives may be examined for inappropriate content at any time. 
2016 DEFINING VAGUE TERMS IN SEX OFFENDER CONTRACTS 419 
Dinapoli from accessing “inappropriate content” on “any electronic device.”87 
However, this condition was not defined in the contract.88 The court determined that 
“inappropriate content” encompasses “sexually stimulating” material.89 Through the 
application of the ejusdem generis,90 the sex offender contract intends to embrace 
“pornography” and the other listed items in the same manner as “stimulating 
material.”91 The court concluded that by use of ejusdem generis, the term 
“inappropriate material” stated in Section 6(D) of the sex offender contract clearly 
includes “sexually oriented” material in its scope.92 The term “sexually oriented or 
sexually stimulating” is synonymous in the context of the sex offender contract and 
are treated in a similar fashion.93 The court, however, noted that Section 6(D)’s 
incorporation of “sexually stimulating” and “pornography” did not intend to make 
the terms interchangeable, but noted that the two could overlap.94 Using this line of 
reasoning, the court held that Section 6(A) of the sex offender contract is not limited 
to “adult” or “pornographic” material when read in conjunction with other provisions 
of the sex offender contract.95 
Third, Dinapoli argued that the conditions within the sex offender contract 
were vague and overly broad because they did not provide sufficient notice that the 
possession of mainstream movies was prohibited and in effect, gave rise to the risk 
of arbitrary enforcement by probation officers.96 The court contended that the sex 
offender contract was necessarily broad to accomplish it purpose, which is to prevent 
the Defendant from possessing material that may lead to recurring criminal activity 
 
Inappropriate content includes, but is not limited to: Sexually stimulating material, 
Pornography (adult or child), adult websites, social networking sites, such as, but not 
limited to Facebook, Myspace and Mocospace, dating websites, and personal ads to 
include cell phone applications. 
Section 6(D) 
I will not patronize any establishment in which sexually oriented material or 
entertainment is available. Including, but not limited to: adult book/video stores, and 
topless/nude clubs. 
Section 6(F) 
I understand that I may be asked to provide my telephone, satellite television, or cable 
bill for examination. Prohibited charges on these bills include: calls to adult hotlines, 
and adult channels. 
Section 6(G)). 
 87. Id. ¶ 20. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Ejusdem Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (“[Latin “of the same kind or class”] 
A canon of construction holding that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general 
word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same class as those listed.”). 
 91. See Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 20 (stating that, under the statutory construction principle of 
ejusdem generis, when words with a general meaning follow words with a more specific meaning, “the 
general words are not construed in their widest extent but are instead construed as applying to persons or 
things of the same kind of class as those specifically mentioned.”) (quoting State v. Nick R., 2009-NMSC-
050, ¶ 21, 147 N.M. 182, 218, P.3d 868). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. ¶ 22. 
 95. Id. ¶ 19. 
 96. Id. ¶ 28. 
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or hinder his rehabilitation.97 The court held that the sex offender contract was not 
impermissibly vague such as to have denied Dinapoli notice.98 The court explained 
that the phrase “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” could be gleaned from 
case law and statute.99 The court also found that Dinapoli had additional notice of 
the prohibited conduct by virtue of his hearing in February.100 
Fourth, Dinapoli argued that the sex offender contract violated his First 
Amendment rights.101 The court held that by “prohibiting the Defendant from 
possessing sexually oriented material, the sex offender contract addressed both the 
need to deter [him] from reoffending and the effort to bolster his rehabilitation.”102 
The court declared that probation is an act of clemency or leniency, and the 
conditions therein are meant to serve the public.103 Adding that “probation is not a 
matter of right,” but rather, it is a criminal sanction and the district court may impose 
reasonable conditions that constrain some freedoms normally enjoyed by law-
abiding citizens.104 
Finally, Dinapoli argued that the district court should have watched the 
movies in their entirety so that the scenes selected by the State could be interpreted 
in context.105 The court first dismissed Dinapoli’s attempt to bring both Rule 11-106 
and the constitutional test for obscenity, noting that neither of the two apply to 
probation hearings.106 Instead, the court reiterated the purpose of probation, which is 
to both prevent an offender from engaging in additional criminal activity and to 
rehabilitate the offender.107 Further, the court reasoned that it is irrelevant whether 
other portions of the DVDs did not contain “sexually oriented” materials or that the 
DVDs taken as a whole could be considered “sexually oriented.”108 Thus, the court 
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion or violate Dinapoli’s due 
process rights by finding that the DVDs met the standard based on the clips of the 
movies that were shown in court.109 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. ¶ 28. 
 101. Id. ¶ 29. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. ¶¶ 31–34; see also Rule 11-106 NMRA (stating that “if a party introduces all or part of a 
writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other 
part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same 
time). 
 107. Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 34. 
 108. Id. ¶ 35. 
 109. Id. 
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B. Critique of the Court’s Analysis in State v. Dinapoli 
Within the past decade, sex offenders have seen their rights become 
severely limited.110 These restraints seek to protect the community, but they also aim 
to rehabilitate the offender to ensure successful reintegration back into their 
community.111 Critics of these restraints question their effectiveness112 and their one-
size-fits-all approach, arguing that they push sex offenders to the fringes of society 
regardless of the degree of the sex crime, which could range from molestation of a 
child to public urination.113 “Not all people who have been convicted of sex offenses 
pose a risk to children, if they pose any risk at all. Blanket residency-restriction laws 
disregard that reality.”114 This Note finds itself alongside these arguments by 
pointing out the notice and enforcement issues. 
This was the primary issue in State v. Dinapoli,115 which decided that the 
phrase “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material” provides the offender 
with sufficient notice as to what conduct would fall under its reach.116 This Note 
argues that Dinapoli117 inadequately addressed the notice and enforcement issues and 
puts forth a simple but effective solution that first separates the terms and then 
provides a detailed definition for each. This approach will resolve the notice issue by 
providing the offender with a comprehensive list of definitions that better articulates 
what type of conduct is prohibits. Likewise, these definitions serve as a guideline for 
probation officers to ensure that the condition is applied fairly and consistently in 
the future. 
1. Notice 
Without proper notice, a sex offender might be unable to determine the 
exact limitations that the probation conditions provide and his or her liberties may 
be severely limited as a result.118 Notice is particularly important at the bargaining 
stage, when the offender is presented with the conditions and is asked to fully 
comprehend their impact. The prospect of freedom can cloud an offender’s ability to 
acknowledge the inherent value of the liberties that the contract waives upon 
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release.119 Additionally, the large number of conditions within the contract can 
present notice issues.120 This is particularly true for people who face mental health 
challenges, or lack education.121 
The current approach assumes that an average sex offender is able to 
understand the conditions well enough to determine what conduct is and is not 
prohibited by the contract without a proper definition. Because the sex offender in 
Dinapoli’s position is unable to determine what constitutes a violation of his 
probation, his protected interest in his probationary status is violated.122 As the 
United States Supreme Court has previously noted: 
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we 
assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful 
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, 
so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent 
by not providing fair warning.123 
In State v. Dinapoli,124 the Court of Appeals spent a large portion of the 
opinion discussing notice. Dinapoli contended that his probation officer did not tell 
him he could not possess the type of movies he had. He testified, for example, that 
he “assumed, foolishly, that that statement was referring to pornographic films . . . 
and pornographic magazines.”125 
The court found that a reasonable person would have been on notice that 
possession of the three mainstream DVDs would have fallen into the “sexually 
oriented or sexually stimulating” category prohibited by the sex offender contract.126 
In doing so, the court dismissed Dinapoli’s contention that Section 6(A) of the 
contract is limited to “adult” or “pornographic” material when read in conjunction 
with other provisions of the contract.127 The court reasoned that Section 6(D) of the 
contract defines “inappropriate content” to include both “sexually stimulating” 
material and “pornography,” but this does not evidence that the two terms are 
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interchangeable.128 The court admits that the two terms might overlap, but it would 
be unreasonable to assume that the two are full inclusive. Citing older NM case law, 
the court explained, “If the intent were to equate sexually stimulating material with 
pornography, there would be no reason to list both items.”129 
Essentially, Dinapoli’s argument that he, a sex offender, believed that 
“sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” material was synonymous with 
“pornography,” was rejected because of prior case law and common knowledge of 
contract construction. Sex offenders should not be held to the standard of legal 
practitioners when determining whether the offender understood the meaning of a 
contract provision. 
2.  Arbitrary Enforcement 
The conditions within the contract in State v. Dinapoli,130 afford probation 
officers with broad discretion to determine what conduct is and is not a violation of 
probation. For example, Dinapoli’s probation officer testified, “Whether something 
falls within the prohibition [“sexually oriented or sexually stimulating”] is entirely 
up to the discretion of the probation officer.”131 Furthermore, in describing what 
conduct would lead to a probation violation Dinapoli’s probation officer testified, 
“For me, it’s black and white. If it has any kind of sex scene in it, they should not 
have it. That’s a violation. That’s the way we’re trained and that’s the way we see it. 
They shouldn’t have it.”132 This testimony illustrates the unilateral attempt by the 
probation officer to define the term because this “black and white” standard was not 
communicated to Dinapoli himself.133 In fact, Dinapoli’s probation officer testified 
that the probation officers in her unit regularly share with one another the titles of 
popular movies that they believe to be prohibited under Section 6 of the contract, 
which apparently includes any number of R-rated mainstream movies containing 
“any kind of sex scene.”134 These statements demonstrate that Dinapoli was not 
afforded proper notice which denied him the opportunity to comply with the 
“sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” condition. This testimony also indicates 
that the probation officers also have trouble interpreting the condition. 
Upon release from prison, Sex offenders are required to serve an 
indeterminate probation sentence of least five years - without a violation.135 This 
creates a perpetual sentencing scheme, under which, a offender might never escape 
because the five year requirement resets itself each time an offender’s probation is 
revoked. Thusly, arbitrary enforcement, coupled with indeterminate sentences, 
eliminates the offender’s ability to control his freedom, and, with that, any trust he 
may have had in the justice system. Essentially, the current approach favors the 
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justice system, and it might protect the public, but at the expense of sex offender’s 
rights.  
III. A SIMPLE BUT EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION TO ELIMINATE 
NOTICE ISSUES AND ENSURE FAIR AND CONSISTENT 
ENFORCEMENT 
A. Previous Scholarship that Falls Short of Providing a Workable Solution 
Other scholars have addressed the issue of notice that arose in Dinapoli, but 
the proposed solutions do not eradicate the underlying problem and focus primarily 
on the vague nature of the term “pornography.” For example, one scholar proposes 
a tailored approach that aims to fashion the specialized conditions of release to the 
individual in an attempt to eliminate the disputes over notice.136 The State of New 
Mexico already attempts to individualize the specialized conditions of release to the 
individual sex offender.137 In spite of these individualized conditions, the notice issue 
remains problematic because all sex offenders must comply with the prohibition of 
“sexually oriented” or “sexually stimulating” material. The tailored approach would 
not resolve the notice issue that this Note is concerned with. 
Another proposal is to reconstruct the language within these specialized 
conditions of release.138 The justification for this approach is that a sufficiently 
specific definition furthers the goal of transitioning a convict from a rigid and 
restrictive prison life back into society, where the offender can live a more productive 
life.139 A proposed definition for “pornography” reads as follows: 
(a)(1) Any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, 
picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, 
whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other 
means, of sexually explicit conduct; or (2) any textual material 
describing sexually explicit conduct accompanied by visual 
depictions of the naked human body, such accompaniment to be 
taken from the publication as a whole; and 
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(b) That a reasonable person could believe is intended to arouse 
sexual excitement. (c) “Sexually explicit conduct” is defined as 
actual or simulated (1)sexual intercourse, including genital-
genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between 
persons of the same or opposite sex; (2) bestiality; (3) 
masturbation; (4) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (5) lascivious 
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.140 
This definition effectively defines conduct that would fall within the reach 
of “pornography,” but does not provide a solution for what conduct falls into the 
“sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” category that is used in New Mexico’s 
sex offender contracts. The court in State v. Dinapoli ruled that the term 
“pornography” and the phrase “sexually oriented and sexually stimulating” are not 
synonymous.141 Thus, the question of what conduct falls under the reach of “sexually 
oriented and sexually stimulating” material remains. 
B. Providing Separate Definitions for the Terms “Sexually Oriented” and 
“Sexually Stimulating” by Using Existing New Mexico Statutes 
With the shortcomings of the two previous proposals in mind, this Note 
meticulously defines the “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” condition to 
prevent future notice and enforcement issues that will continue to arise if no changes 
are made. The proposed solution begins by separating the condition to become 
“sexually oriented” and “sexually stimulating” to allow for a functional approach to 
identifying the clear boundaries for both the offender and probation officer. 
The court in State v. Green used existing statutes and ruled that sexually 
oriented and sexually stimulating material is sufficiently clear to provide notice that 
an image of a naked woman would constitute as a violation of probation.142 Relying 
on the Green court’s use of existing case law, the court in Dinapoli also held that 
“sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” under 6(A) was sufficiently clear as to 
have provided Dinapoli with notice as to what conduct was prohibited. However, the 
standard used by this group of probation officers, deprives the offender, like 
Dinapoli, the opportunity to comply with the numerous conditions within the sex 
offender contract. Leaving the problem that probation officers are afforded with a 
broad discretion to find a violation on what they “think” is a violation as opposed to 
what the probationer was notified and understands the condition to mean. 
History has revealed that sex offenders are perceived to be by many to be 
the epitome of evil and not without justification. Nonetheless, the offender, by virtue 
of being charged with a sex offense, is branded a monster and is required to comply 
with an innumerable amount of post release conditions. That being the case, 
specialized conditions of release function to protect the public and rehabilitate and 
eventually reintegrate the offender back into society. Reintegration is only attainable 
if the offender is aware of the boundaries that these conditions provide. 
This Note puts forth an intelligible proposal to reconstruct and define the 
language under Section 6(A) of the sex offender contract. This definition and the 
 
 140. Id. at 754–55. 
 141. Dinapoli, 2015-NMCA-066, ¶ 22. 
 142. State v. Green, 2015-NMCA-007, ¶ 25, 341 P.3d 10. 
426 NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW Vol. 46; No. 2 
language therein, is influenced by definitions for terms in New Mexico’s Sexual 
Exploitation of Children Act.143 The proposed definition reads as follows: 
(Section 6) Computers/Electronics/Entertainment 
A. I will not “knowingly” purchase, possess or subscribe to 
material that is substantially “sexually oriented” or substantially 
“sexually stimulating.” 
B. Conduct of this type is prohibited in both “visual” and “print” 
mediums. 
i. “Knowingly” means having general knowledge of, or reason 
to know, or reasonable ground for belief in which warrants 
further inspection or inquiry or both, of the character and 
content of any material described herein, which is reasonably 
subject to examination by the defendant; 
ii. “Nudity” meaning the showing of the male or female 
genitals, pubic area or buttocks, or if such person be female, 
breasts. 
iii. For purposes of this condition, a “visual” medium is 
defined as: any film, photography, negative, slide, computer 
diskette, videotape, videodisc or any computer or 
electronically generated imagery. 
iv. For purposes of this condition, a “print” medium is defined 
as: any book, magazine or other form of publication or 
photographic reproduction containing or incorporating any 
film, photography, negative, slide, computer diskette, 
videotape, videodisc or any computer generated or 
electronically generated imagery. 
v. “Sexually oriented” encompasses the following: Nudity, 
sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, 
anal-genital or oral-anal, whether between persons of the 
same or opposite sex, bestiality, masturbation, 
sadomasochistic abuse, or sexual exhibition with a focus on 
the genitals or pubic area of any person. 
vi. “Sexually Stimulating” means to cause the offender to be 
sexually excited, aroused, or provoked to act on a sexual 
desire triggered by the prohibited item regardless of how 
obscure or odd the desire. This condition is subjective and 
narrow, and should only be used when: 
a.  A court or probation officer has prohibited a specific 
item or source of material, as opposed to a general or 
categorical ban; 
b. The prohibition is a result of a unique characteristic 
that the offender possesses demonstrating a strong 
likelihood that he or she will be sexually exited, 
aroused, or tempted to act in a sexual manner, when the 
prohibited item is present; 
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c. The offender is found to be in possession of the 
prohibited item; and 
d. The offender was notified in advance that this 
particular item was prohibited. 
This definition resolves the notice issue that was discussed in State v. 
Dinapoli,144 for three reasons. First, the proposed definition provides bright lines that 
would communicate to the sex offender what conduct would lead to a violation of 
probation. Similarly, this definition separates the terms “sexually oriented” and 
“sexually stimulating” to allow the offender to understand that the former serves as 
a general ban and includes the obvious kinds of materials that are prohibited 
regardless of the offender. Alternatively, the offender is informed that the latter 
(sexually stimulating) prohibits particular items and materials unique to the 
particular profile of the offender. 
Second, probation officers will not have broad discretion to self-regulate 
the terms of the contract. As a result, arbitrary rulings will be reduced. This will lead 
to more and more offenders trusting the justice system. In effect, trust in the justice 
system provides an incentive to comply with the conditions of release, because the 
offender believes that he is in control of his own fate. 
Third, this definition does away with the “any” quantifier that went 
immediately before “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” material. In its place 
the word “substantially” is inserted. This further limits the opportunity for arbitrary 
enforcement and seeks to prevent unintentional probation violations. Section 6(A) 
includes a wide range of materials (i.e., books, magazines, photographs) and when 
coupled with the “any” quantifier, it creates a blanket prohibition those materials. 
For example, if a literary work because one page contains a sentence discussing 
sexual intercourse, or a movie contains a two second showing of a woman’s breasts, 
then the prior version of the condition could lead to a probation violation. In contrast, 
the “substantial” requirement would not find a violation in a situation where the 
nudity was not foreseen and not the purpose for possessing it. 
In Dinapoli’s case, applying this standard, a violation would have been 
upheld. Dinapoli would have been put on notice that these DVDs would constitute 
as a violation of probation because the conduct falls under Section 6(A)(B), as a 
“visual medium” that includes “sexually oriented” material including 
“sadomasochistic abuse” and “genital-anal conduct.” The possession of the three 
mainstream DVDs would have been a violation of the proposed condition. 
1. Prohibited vs. non-prohibited materials: putting the proposed 
definition of “sexually oriented and sexually stimulating” to use 
This section provides illustrations of scenarios where the proposed 
definition effectively dichotomizes prohibited and non-prohibited materials. 
Admittedly, this demonstration is not exhaustive, but it does demonstrate how this 
definition would improve the ability to determine whether a particular item is 
prohibited. 
First scenario: Playboy the magazine vs. Sports Illustrated, the Swimsuit 
Edition. Here, Playboy the Magazine would be prohibited under the proposed 
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definition because it projects images of nude women and contains discussions about 
sexual intercourse. This would serve as “sexually oriented” under Section (6)(A)(B) 
as a “print form” (magazine) showing images of “nudity” (female genitals and 
breasts) and discusses sexual intercourse. In contrast, Sports Illustrated, the Swimsuit 
Edition, would not be prohibited under the proposed definition. Although the 
magazine includes women in swimsuits, it does not show the woman’s unclothed 
genitals or breasts. The magazine is a general sports magazine and does not devote 
articles to sexual intercourse. 
That being said, the probation officer does have the ability to prohibit 
particular items under the “sexually stimulating” portion of the condition. For 
example, if a sex offender was convicted of molesting women in bathing suits at the 
beach, then the probation officer could be justified in prohibiting the Swimsuit 
Magazine. This would be a justifiable prohibition because the Swimsuit Magazine 
depicts women that identify with the offenders criminal profile and victim choice. 
Second scenario: Fifty Shades of Grey (book)145 vs. A Game of Thrones 
(book).146 The former would be prohibited under the proposed definition because it 
contains “sexually oriented” material in the “print form.” Fifty Shades of Grey 
contains in-depth descriptions about “sexual intercourse,” “between persons of the 
opposite sex.” This serves as an example in which the “substantial” requirement is 
satisfied. In contrast, A Game of Thrones devotes very little of its text to discussing 
and describing “sexual intercourse.” This would not satisfy the “substantial” 
requirement. 
Third scenario: Nude Poster vs. Nude Painting or drawing. This example 
demonstrates the difference between the mediums that are included in this section. 
The nude poster would be covered as an “other form of publication” exhibiting 
“nudity” and would be prohibited. But the nude painting, or drawing, would not be 
covered by the definition. It would be up to the probation officer or the New Mexico 
Corrections Department to craft a condition that prohibits nude paintings or 
drawings. 
Fourth scenario: A movie containing nudity found in a common living area 
vs. a movie with nudity found amongst in an area completely controlled by a sex 
offender. This scenario attempts to provide an example about how the intent element 
“knowingly” is used. If, for example, a probation officer were to find a copy of “The 
Girl with the Dragon Tattoo” in a sex offenders house, but it was shelved alongside 
fifty other movies in a common living area shared by other non-sex offenders, then 
it is very unlikely that the offender had “knowledge” that the movie was “possessed” 
by the sex offender, as is intended by the definition. In contrast, if the probation 
officer found the same movie in the sex offender’s bedroom and it was amongst thirty 
others, it would constitute as “knowledge” of possession because the offender has 
control over the area in question. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Note argues that the condition prohibiting “sexually oriented and 
sexually stimulating” material is impermissibly broad and vague; as a result, it 
creates notice and enforcement issues. This Note accordingly proposes that the 
“sexually oriented or sexually stimulating” condition be separated and properly 
defined. This proposal achieves two goals: (1) to properly define “sexually oriented” 
and “sexually stimulating” material to provide sex offenders with notice and a 
comprehensive understanding of the prohibition; and (2) to supply probation officers 
with a guideline that ensures fairly and consistently enforced. 
Sex offenders have unquestionably earned the negative reception from the 
public and the resulting restrictions resulting from their actions. However, when an 
offender, like Robert Dinapoli, is unaware that his actions are prohibited, it defeats 
the purpose that specialized conditions of release. For rehabilitation to be effective, 
the offender needs to be cognizant of his actions in relation to the conduct prohibited 
by the various conditions. Only then can a sex offender acknowledge that he is on 
the right side of the line, which will aid his decision-making when he is released back 
into society. 
Although it can be argued that creating a bright line definition, as proposed 
here, will allow the sex offender to acknowledge the boundaries and “tip-toe” around 
them, finding ways to continue their predatory agendas, the reality is that the 
proposed definition is more restrictive in many ways than the existing condition. For 
example, Dinapoli’s possession of the three mainstream DVDs would not have been 
permissible. Unlike the existing standard, under the proposed definition, Dinapoli 
would be unable to argue that notice was not provided. Probation officers will not be 
granted the broad decision to enforce the condition, and instead will be limited to the 
clear and bright lines within the proposed definition. This eliminates the use of 
arbitrary enforcement. The offender does inherent a more restrictive standard to 
abide by, but in exchange, the offender receives notice and the assurance that the 
condition will be fairly and consistently enforced. 
Admittedly, Section 6(A) is merely a portion of the Sex Offender 
Behavioral Contract. Nevertheless, the definition proposed by this Note can 
influence the construction of future conditions. More importantly, this proposal can 
shed light on the severe consequences and lack of justice that sex offenders face 
when they are forced to comply with broad and vague conditions. 
